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Retirement celebrations are odd events. They are a mixture of joy and
sadness, and that is emphatically true of those in honor of Justice Brennan.
Not since the retirement of Justice Holmes in the early 1930's has the na-
tion been more generous in its tributes to a retiring justice. Justice Brennan
served the Court for nearly thirty-four years and now, at a mere 84 (Holmes
was 90), retires with a grandeur that is indeed stunning. In this, there is reason
for joy because the Justice fully deserves all the accolades and honors that have
been bestowed upon him. I rejoice in Brennan's glory and feel the pleasures
of the moment, but I would be less than honest if I did not also acknowledge
my sadness on this occasion, not just for the Justice who so loved his work,
but even more for the law. His retirement imperils the achievements of the
Warren Court in new and profound ways.
The Warren Court refers to that extraordinary phase of Supreme Court
history that began in the mid-1950's, with Brown v. Board of Education and
the appointments of Earl Warren (1954) and William J. Brennan, Jr. (1956),
and which reached its apogee in the early 1960's, when Justice Frankfurter
retired and the liberal wing of the Court achieved a solid majority. Aside from
Warren and Brennan, that majority included Hugo Black, William 0. Douglas,
and Frankfurter's replacement, Arthur J. Goldberg, who served from 1962 until
1965 and then was replaced by Abe Fortas. In 1967, the group of five was
strengthened when Thurgood Marshall replaced Tom Clark. Now and then, they
picked up the vote of Potter Stewart or Byron White or even that of their most
forceful critic, John Harlan, a conservative who often found himself encum-
bered by his commitment to stare decisis. Earl Warren retired from the chief
justiceship in 1969, but the phase of Supreme Court history that bears his name
continued into the early 1970's, probably until 1974. I clerked for Justice
Brennan during the term of Court that began in October 1965 and ended the
next summer.
Like everything else, law always has an antecedent. The roots of the
jurisprudence of the Warren Court can be found inearlier periods, most espe-
cially in those decisions of the Supreme Court in the 1930's, when the Court
gave important life to the principle guaranteeing freedom of speech, elevating
the dissents of Holmes and Brandeis to majority status, and also began to
intervene in criminal proceedings to assure a modicum of procedural fairness.
1117
HeinOnline -- 100 Yale L.J. 1117 1990-1991
The Yale Law Journal
But there was something distinctive and special about the Warren Court, almost
a new beginning. Brown itself undertook the most challenging of all constitu-
tional tasks, making good on the nation's promise of racial equality. Even more
importantly, that case embodied both a conception of law and a set of commit-
ments that evolved into a broad-based program of constitutional reform. The
Court saw the Bill of Rights and the Civil War Amendments as the embodiment
of our highest ideals and soon made them the standard for judging the estab-
lished order.
In the 1950's, America was not a pretty sight. Jim Crow reigned supreme.
Blacks were systematically disenfranchised and excluded from juries. State-
fostered religious practices, like school prayers, were pervasive. Legislatures
were grossly gerrymandered and malapportioned. McCarthyism stifled radical
dissent, and the jurisdiction of the censor over matters considered obscene or
libelous had no constitutional limits. The heavy hand of the law threatened
those who publicly provided information and advice concerning contraceptives,
thereby imperiling the most intimate of human relationships. The states virtually
had a free hand in the administration of justice. Trials often proceeded without
counsel or jury. Convictions were allowed to stand even though they turned on
illegally seized evidence or on statements extracted from the accused under
coercive circumstances. There were no rules limiting the imposition of the death
penalty. These practices victimized the poor and disadvantaged, as did the
welfare system, which was administered in an arbitrary and oppressive manner.
The capacity of the poor to participate in civic activities was also limited by
the imposition of poll taxes, court filing fees, and the like.
These were the challenges that the Warren Court took up and spoke to in
a forceful manner. The result was a program of constitutional reform almost
revolutionary in its aspiration and, now and then, in its achievements. Of course
the Court did not act in a political or social vacuum. It drew on broad-based
social formations like the civil rights and welfare rights movements. At critical
junctures, the Court looked to the executive and legislative branches for sup-
port. The dual school system of Jim Crow could not have been dismantled
without the troops in Little Rock, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the interven-
tions of the Department of Justice and HEW, the suits of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, or the black citizens who dared to become plaintiffs or, even
more, to break the color line or march on behalf of their rights. The sixties
would not have been what they were without the involvement of all of these
institutions and persons, and the world would have looked very different. Yet
the truth of the matter is that it was the Warren Court that spurred the great
changes to follow, and inspired and protected those who sought to implement
them.
A constitutional program so daring and so bold was, of course, the work
of many minds. As is customary, we use the name of the chief justice to refer
to this period of Supreme Court history, and in Warren's case that practice
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seems especially appropriate. Earl Warren was a man of great dignity and
vision, in every respect a leader, who discharged his duties (even the most
trivial, such as admitting new members to the bar) with a grace and cheerful-
ness that were remarkable. He presided in a way that filled the courtroom with
a glow. Yet the substance of the Court's work, the revolution that it effectuated
in our understanding of the Constitution, drew on the talents and ideas of all
those who found themselves entrusted with the judicial power at that unusual
moment of history.
Justice Brennan's contribution to the ensemble known as the Warren Court
had many dimensions. He was devoted to the values we identify with the
Warren Court-equality, procedural fairness, freedom of speech, and religious
liberty-and he was prepared to act on them. More importantly, he was the
justice primarily assigned the task of speaking for the Court. The overall design
of the Court's position may have been the work of several minds, fully reflect-
ing the contributions of such historic figures as Black, Douglas, and Warren,
but it was Brennan who by and large formulated the principle, analyzed the
precedents, and chose the words that transformed the ideal into law. Like any
master craftsman, he left his distinctive imprint on the finished product.
Warren and Brennan were invariably on the same side in the great constitu-
tional cases of the day. They served together for thirteen terms and agreed in
89% of the more than 1400 cases they decided. Indeed, it is hard to think of
a case of any import where they differed. As chief justice, Warren had the
responsibility of assigning the task of speaking for the Court when his side
prevailed. Sometimes, as in Reynolds v. Sims and Miranda v. Arizona, where
he felt the need for the imprimatur of his office, or where the issue was espe-
cially close to his heart, Warren wrote the opinion. But generally he turned to
Justice Brennan.
In part, this reflected the unusual personal tie that developed between the
two. The Chief-as Justice Brennan always called him-visited Brennan's
chambers frequently, and each visit was an important occasion for the chambers
as a whole and for Justice Brennan in particular. One could see at a glance the
admiration and affection that each felt for the other. The relationship between
Earl Warren and William Brennan was one of the most extraordinary relation-
ships between two colleagues that I have ever known; surely, it must be one
of the most famous in the law.
But more than personal sentiment was involved. In turning to Brennan,
Warren could be certain that the task of writing the opinion for the Court was
in the hands of someone as thoroughly devoted as he was to the Court as an
institution. An assignment is always an expression of trust, and Warren could
depend on Brennan to formulate and express the Court's position-to declare
the principle and attend to the details that constitute the law-in a way that
would strengthen the Court in the eyes of both the public and the profession,
and thus enhance its capacity to do its great work. Brennan was, in the highest
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and best sense of the word, a statesman: not a person who tempers principle
with prudence, but rather someone who is capable of grasping a multiplicity
of conflicting principles, some of which relate to the well-being of the institu-
tion and remind the judge that his duty is not just to speak the law, but also
to see to it that it becomes an actuality-in the words of Cooper v. Aaron, to
make sure that the law becomes "a living truth."
Brennan could be trusted to choose his words in a way that would minimize
the disagreement among the justices, not only to avoid those silly squabbles
that might interfere with the smooth functioning of a collegial institution, as
the Court most certainly is, but also to produce a majority opinion and strength-
en the force of what the Court had to say. Only five votes are needed for a
decision to become law, but the stronger the majority and broader the consen-
sus, the more plausible is its claim for authority. Brennan could also be trusted
to respect the traditions of the bar and to pay homage to the principle of stare
decisis. He always tried to build from within. Sometimes that was not possible,
for the break with the past was just too great. Yet, even then, Brennan's
inclination, once again rooted in a concern for the Court's authority, was to
minimize the disruption, and to find, if at all possible, a narrow path through
the precedents. Brennan also understood that reform as bold as the Court tried
to effectuate required a coordination, not a separation, of powers, and that
gratuitous confrontations with the other branches were to be avoided. In fact,
as evident from Justice Brennan's opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, affirming
a broad conception of congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, every effort was made to invite the other branches of government
to participate and collaborate in the program of constitutional reform inspired
by the Court.
Aside from a proper regard for institutional needs, a successful opinion
requires a mastery of legal craft, which Warren also found in Brennan. Justice
Brennan was as much the lawyer as the statesman. Law is a blend of the
theoretical and the technical, and though there were others as gifted as Brennan
in the formulation of a theoretical principle, there was no one in the ruling
coalition-certainly not before Fortas's appointment-who had either the
patience or the ability to master the technical detail that is also the law. Every-
one on the Court, law clerk and justice alike, admired Brennan's command of
vast bodies of learning, ancient and modern. He knew the cases and the statutes,
and how they interacted, and understood how the legal system worked and how
it might be made to work better. Among the majority, he was the lawyer's
judge.
Even Brennan's most theoretically ambitious opinions, like New York Times
v. Sullivan, bear the lawyer's mark. In that case Justice Brennan spoke of the
national commitment to a debate on public issues that is "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open," and he has been justly celebrated many times for reformulating
the theory of freedom of speech associated with the work of Alexander
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Meiklejohn in a fresh and original way. Meiklejohn, then in his nineties, saw
Brennan's opinion in New York Times v. Sullivan "as an occasion for dancing
in the streets." Of even greater importance to the lawyers and judges among
us (Meiklejohn was a political theorist) was Brennan's analysis of the common
law of libel and his deft reformulation of doctrine-the announcement of the
"actual malice" requirement-in order to create a rule that, one, would be
operational and, two, would effectuate a just accommodation of reputational
interests and democratic values. New York Times v. Sullivan is a great decision,
a fountainhead of freedom in our day, only because it is an exercise in political
philosophy made law.
In 1968, Richard Nixon ran against the Warren Court, and in so doing,
attacked Justice Brennan as much as anyone, perhaps more so, given the
commanding role that Brennan played on that Court. But history soon took an
odd turn: the Warren Court collapsed, but Brennan remained. Prior to the
election of 1968, but clearly with a view as to its likely outcome, Earl Warren
tendered his resignation to President Johnson in an effort to turn the leadership
of the Court over to Johnson's confidant, Abe Fortas. The Senate, however,
balked on the elevation of Fortas, and his nomination for the chief justiceship
was soon withdrawn. Yet following the 1968 election, Nixon made good on
Earl Warren's resignation and began his presidency with the appointment of
Warren Burger as chief justice. In addition, Fortas was forced to resign from
the Court, due to the disclosure of financial improprieties; and with the resigna-
tions of John Harlan and Hugo Black, President Nixon found himself able to
make three other appointments during his first term in office. Over time, one
of those appointments-Harry A. Blackmun--evolved into ajustice whose view
of the Constitution turned out to be similar to those who sat on the Warren
Court. But the two other appointments-Lewis Powell and William
Rehnquist-were of a different character. There were differences between the
views of Powell and Rehnquist, but the views of both were at odds with the
jurisprudence that reigned supreme during the sixties.
The final dissolution of the Warren Court occurred with the resignation of
Douglas in 1975 and his replacement by John Paul Stevens. The balance of
power had decisively shifted, and was then locked in place by two accidents
of history: Jimmy Carter had no appointments to make, a distinction he shared
with no other President in our history who completed a full term, while Ronald
Reagan had three-Antonin Scalia (to fill the vacancy created by Burger's
resignation), Sandra Day O'Connor (to replace Stewart), and Anthony Kennedy
(to replace Powell). In 1986, at the same time he appointed Scalia, President
Reagan elevated Rehnquist to the chief justiceship, but that change only
conformed outward appearances to the inner reality. For much of the seventies
and eighties it was Rehnquist who led the Court, building the necessary co-
alitions, setting the agenda, and formulating the methods of revision. Even
during Burger's years, it was the Rehnquist Court.
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These changes ushered in a new phase of Supreme Court history, and
Justice Brennan found himself working in a wholly new environment. He could
turn to Marshall and, to a considerable extent, Blackmun, for support, but from
there on in the going was rough. No longer a dominant figure in the ruling
coalition, Brennan became part of the opposition, pitted against a majority
driven by a contrary vision of American law and life. The new majority
believed that the doctrine of the Warren Court was mistaken and had to be
limited, corrected, and perhaps even eradicated.
Brown, of course, was not overruled, but it has been drained of much of
its generative power. Arresting the trajectory that was implicit in cases like
Green v. School Board of New Kent County, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, and Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, all ultimately
rooted in Brown, the Court ruled that school systems that contain a large
number of all-black and all-white schools are constitutionally acceptable.
According to the new majority, Brown condemned not the inequality resulting
from the actual separation of the races, but only the use of racial criteria as a
method of assignment. As a result, the Court has allowed school boards to
assign students to schools on the basis of neighborhoods, even where there is
residential segregation; it also effectively insulated suburban communi-
ties-invariably white-from the reach of court orders trying to desegregate
the inner-city schools. School boards remain obliged to correct for vestiges of
past practices, such as racial gerrymandering, but the Rehnquist Court has
shifted the emphasis and underscored the limited nature of the remedial obliga-
tion, both geographically and temporally.
Even outside of the school desegregation context, which might have been
thought to be a category unto itself, the egalitarianism of the Warren Court has
been curbed by new renderings of the provision that constituted that Court's
nerve center-the equal protection clause. In cases like Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, which upheld the award of a state liquor license to a club that openly
discriminated on the basis of race, a sharp distinction was drawn between state
and society, confining the ban on discrimination to state action narrowly under-
stood. In addition, the Court ruled that in order to establish a denial of equal
protection it is not enough to show that the state action especially disadvantages
minorities; it must be shown that such an effect is intended by the state. In the
mid-1970's, the Court also effectively removed the poor from the scope of the
equal protection clause, leaving the war on poverty more vulnerable than ever
to the vicissitudes of politics. In the same case, the Court declared that educa-
tion was not a fundamental right, thereby bringing to a halt the process of
enumerating rights that would warrant special solicitude under the equal protec-
tion clause. Even the commitment to strict numerical equality in the apportion-
ment context has been diluted, as the Court became more and more tolerant of
departures from the "one person, one vote" standard.
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The Rehnquist Court also created new cracks in the wall between church
and state by allowing the state to engage in practices, such as the maintenance
of a creche, that earlier would have been unthinkable. In addition, the Court's
commitment to maintaining public debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" has been compromised during this period. Lacking the steely tolerance
for political protest that characterized the Warren Court at its most determined
moment, the Court under Rehnquist upheld laws that denied political activists
the opportunity to reach the public at shopping centers or in front of certain
government buildings, or through posting posters on utility poles, demonstrating
in public parks, and picketing in residential neighborhoods. It also refused to
create access to the networks for editorial advertisements sponsored by a group
of businessmen criticizing the Vietnam War. On the other hand, a number of
laws trying to limit political expenditures were struck down as violative of the
First Amendment, even though these measures were conceived as means of pre-
serving the vitality of democratic politics by preventing the wealthy from
drowning out the voices of the less affluent in society. In these cases, and
others, the new majority seemed to be confounding the protection of speech
with the protection of property.
In the criminal context, the new majority lifted the ban on the application
of the death penalty that had its roots in the sixties and that formally took effect
in the early seventies. Since 1976 more than 140 persons convicted of crimes
have been put to death, and Rehnquist, both as a judge and in discharge of his
administrative responsibilities as head of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, seems determined to institute a series of procedural reforms that would
expedite and facilitate that process. Similarly, the Court has sought to shift the
balance of advantage in the criminal process, relaxing some of the restrictions
on the investigatory techniques of the police, most notably the rule excluding
illegally seized evidence.
During the 1960's the Court had opened the doors of the federal trial courts
for writs of habeas corpus and injunctions against state criminal proceedings.
This was done to ensure that state criminal proceedings adhered to minimum
standards of fairness and to make certain that these proceedings were not used
for improper purposes, such as the harassment of political activists. During the
1970's and 1980's those doors were closed. Fay v. Noia and Dombrowski v.
Pfister, opinions by Brennan that gave substance to the view that federal courts
are the primary forum for the protection of federal rights, were emptied of all
operative significance. A similar fate befell Goldberg v. Kelly, also written by
Justice Brennan, which had extended the due process revolution of the sixties
from the criminal to the civil domain. Today, government is allowed to act to
the detriment of individuals, to inflict grievous suffering on them, for example,
by denying disability benefits or terminating parental rights, without providing
some of the most elementary forms of due process.
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The law does not move slowly, but it does move unevenly, and during the
last twenty years all has not been bleak, even for someone with Brennan's
outlook. There have been a few bright moments. The most significant are Roe
v. Wade, a 1973 decision creating a right to abortion, and Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, which, in effect, indicated that certain prefer-
ential treatment programs for minorities were permissible, a ruling later to be
extended to women in Johnson v. Transportation Agency. No one should be-
little those achievements, or any of the others that might come to mind, but
they should not be taken as representative of the judicial era of which they are
a part. Roe v. Wade and Bakke did not insert new premises into the law, but
built on understandings of an earlier time. These cases were hard-fought
victories that sharply divided the Court, and to this day survive by the narrow-
est of margins. At present, they define the outer limits of the law, barely toler-
ated, without any generative power of their own.
The danger to these decisions would have significantly increased if the
campaign to place Robert Bork on the Court had been successful. As a law
professor, as Solicitor General during the Nixon and Ford administrations, and
as a federal appellate judge, Bork was a principal figure in the attack on the
Warren Court and a relentless critic of Roe v. Wade and Bakke and the prece-
dents upon which they were based. President Reagan's decision in 1987 to
nominate him to the Supreme Court forced the Senate to consider carefully the
jurisprudence of both Bork and the traditions which he so criticized, and the
result was a series of hearings that offered the country an extraordinary seminar
on constitutional law. The importance of those hearings and the decision of the
Senate to reject the nomination cannot be denied. It should be understood,
however, that contrary to what some have maintained, Bork would not have
been a transformative appointment; that transformation had already occurred
a decade earlier and continues to this day.
Living through this period was not easy for Justice Brennan. It proved to
be a test of sorts, and as such brought to the fore many of his strengths. Value
commitments that were shared in the sixties became distinguishing features of
the Justice in the seventies and eighties and, as a result, are now recognized
as a source of his identity and also his greatness. In some instances, his under-
standing of the Constitution evolved over time. A striking example is the
change in his position on obscenity. In 1973 he rejected the strategy that he had
created in 1957 in Roth v. United States and refined throughout the sixties-of
keeping censorship to a minimum by providing a narrow definition of that
genre of speech that falls outside the ambit of First Amendment protection-
and took up a position close to the absolutism of Black and Douglas. Brennan
indicated that characterizing sexually explicit material as obscene was not a
sufficient justification for restricting its availability to consenting adults.
For the most part, however, the seventies and eighties were for Brennan a
period devoted primarily to defending the achievements of the Warren Court.
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At times that consisted of demanding that the Court take the inevitable next
step, say, of extending the egalitarianism of Brown to issues of gender, most
of the time, however, he had to confront the most blatant retrenchment. In this
context the nation learned what his clerks knew first hand-namely, that the
Justice is extraordinarily strong-minded-and when the day was done, he
emerged as a national hero, a freedom fighter of sorts. On issues of detail
Brennan is conciliatory, but when it comes to what he regards as matters of
principle he is adamant and, in the best sense of the word, stubborn.
This stubbornness expressed itself in many ways, not the least of which was
the profusion of dissents. One enterprising law clerk, more familiar with Lexis
than I, calculated that over his career Justice Brennan wrote dissenting opinions
in 2,347 cases, mostly during the 1970's and 1980's. Of those, 1,517 were in
death penalty cases, and a great number of them were formulaic dissents from
the denial of certiorari, jointly issued with Marshall. But even subtracting these,
the number of dissenting opinions remains impressive-830. During the last
term alone, the Justice wrote dissenting opinions in 23 cases. During the term
I clerked, one of the halcyon days of the Warren Court, Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion in only one case, United States v. Guest, and it is not even
clear whether that opinion should be regarded as a dissent. As commentators
soon realized, though his opinion in that case was labeled a "dissent," it
actually set forth a view of congressional authority which, when read in con-
junction with Justice Clark's separate concurrence, had the support of a majority
of five justices and which, along with Katzenbach v. Morgan, later was used
to provide the constitutional foundation for the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
The escalation in the number of Justice Brennan's dissents during the
Rehnquist years is indeed striking, all the more so because it is so much greater
than the number of dissenting opinions written by the first Justice Harlan or
Justice Holmes, both of whom are often referred to as the great dissenters. Over
their careers, Harlan wrote 134 dissents and Holmes 81, but these numbers
seem trivial when compared to the number of Brennan's dissents. It would be
a mistake, however, to view Justice Brennan, even during this second phase
of his career on the Court, as we view Holmes or the first Harlan, as another
great dissenter or, as the enterprising clerk declared, the greatest dissenter.
As a matter of collegial style, both Harlan and Holmes were loners, and in
addition, Holmes's philosophic outlook supremely suited him to the role of
dissenter. Holmes viewed history, or even the action of his brethren, much as
a spectator might. At times he was prepared to raise his voice in protest, as he
did in Lochner v. New York and Abrams v. United States, but he did so with
an indifference as to whether he persuaded his colleagues or managed to obtain
their votes. Holmes spoke to the future, and as it turned out he was prophetic,
but his basic intent was to speak his mind and let the chips fall wherever they
might. Justice Brennan, on the other hand, never, but never, was a loner nor
a spectator, but always was thoroughly engaged with his colleagues, passionate-
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ly working to build a majority; in the 1950's and 1960's he did so to implement
the revolution, in the 1970's and 1980's to stop the counterrevolution. The
Brennan dissents of the 1970's and 1980's spoke not to the future, but to his
colleagues. More often than not they read like majority opinions that just fell
short of one or two votes. In one notable instance involving congressional
power under the commerce clause, he soon managed to sway one of the
previous majority to switch, thereby transforming the position he originally
articulated in dissent into the law of the land.
Moreover, while the second phase of Brennan's career is marked by an
extraordinary number of dissents, one should not be misled by the numbers.
The dissents were not at the core of his mission. At the occasional law clerk
dinners held during the 1970's and 1980's, he would wryly announce the tallies
to the assembled. We would cheer the resistance offered by his dissents. But
it was obvious that the Justice's true source of pleasure came in the cases in
which he somehow-miraculously, I think-formed a majority that held the
line. Rehnquist was usually on the other side, and because of his seniority,
Brennan acted as a shadow chief justice and often assigned himself the task
of speaking for the odd coalition that he pulled together. Justice Brennan's last
term on the Court was marked by a large number of dissents, but of equal, even
greater, significance is the fact that in two important cases-one involving
flagburning, the other patronage-he was able to speak for the majority in
support of freedom of speech. It was entirely fitting that on the last day of his
last term on the Court, after almost thirty-four years of service, he announced
an opinion for a majority of the Court upholding an FCC policy-born of
another era-that favored minority interests in awarding broadcasting licenses.
Later that afternoon, Justice Brennan received the prognosis from his doctor
that led to his decision to retire.
Justice Brennan is a proud man, not in the least bit arrogant-indeed he is
one of the most modest men I have ever known-but he is someone who takes
a very special pride in his work. He is a fighter who likes to win, and as such,
would be pained to see an earlier victory reversed, especially when, as in the
line of cases that undid Dombrowski, the new majority, also trying to build
from within, turned Brennan's doctrinal creations to another purpose. The fight
in Brennan no doubt accounted for the sense of engagement that carried him
through the seventies and eighties, and helps explain the unusual role he created
for himself during that period. It was, however, dwarfed by an even more
significant factor: his devotion to the institution.
In the Warren Court era, this devotion accounted for Brennan's role as
Court spokesman and for the distinctive nature of his opinions. He took no
pleasure in speaking alone, but always tried to speak through the Court and to
mold judicial doctrine in a way that was fully sensitive to the needs of that
institution. His first priority was to have the Court speak authoritatively and
his second was to produce an opinion that would strengthen the effectiveness
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of the Court. He strove to avoid any gestures that would either dissolve or
splinter the majority, infuriate those on the other side of the bench, or set into
motion a political dynamic that would undermine the ability of the Court to
achieve all that it might. During the second half of his tenure, these same senti-
ments shaped his strategy of resistance. Dissent was always a possibility, but
his first priority was that the Court speak to the issue in an authoritative
manner, because he continued to believe in the Court and that law mattered.
He remained committed to working through the institution, not to propounding
his views, speaking his mind, or otherwise indulging himself. Dissent was a
reluctant last resort-almost an acknowledgment of failure.
In this way, Brennan served as the bridge between the Constitution that was
and the Constitution that is. He was the mediating force in the negative dialectic
between the Warren and Rehnquist Courts. I can assure you that there is no one
left on the Court, not even Justice Marshall (for whom I also clerked), who can
play that role in quite the way that Brennan did. At the hands of Rehnquist and
those inclined to follow him, the Warren Court has suffered grievously, and
today, without Brennan on the bench, the work of that institution stands more
in jeopardy than ever. Some, like Scalia, appear determined to chart their own
process of revision, but the danger they pose to the body of law associated with
the Warren Court is every bit as great.
Of course, Justice Brennan has left us a written legacy. The pages of the
United States Reports are filled with his opinions, both dissents and majority
opinions. A few years back, still another of his law clerks surveyed the leading
casebooks on constitutional law and reported that of all the so-called "principal"
cases featured in those books, Justice Brennan had written more than any other
justice in the entire history of the Supreme Court. These opinions define the
field within which the present Court operates; for some they will act as con-
straints, for others a resource-and if the testimony of Brennan's replacement,
David Souter, is to be believed, for some they might even act as an inspiration.
But these opinions will not compensate for the loss of Brennan's vote, even
less for his absence within the councils of the Court.
During the October 1965 Term, the conferences were held on Fridays. Later
that day, or more commonly on Saturdays, when the Justice would regularly
have lunch with his clerks, he would describe what transpired at conference,
or at least what he thought we should know about the conference. Some sense
of the inner workings of the Court was also conveyed during the dinners he
had with his clerks during the late 1960's and early 1970's. At that time the
law clerk dinners were an annual event and the number of former clerks small
enough that we could sit around a table upstairs at the Occidental. Those were
also the days-prior to the publication of The Brethren-when he could assume
that law clerks could be trusted with a confidence. The Justice was not a man
for gossip, or small talk about his colleagues (though his interest in the personal
lives of his clerks was boundless-he treated us as members of his family). But
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he saw himself as a teacher, supplementing and enriching what we might have
learned in the classroom, and he believed that understanding the dynamics
among the justices was a crucial part of our education, especially if, as he
hoped, 'we would go on to become teachers. He wanted us and our students to
know how law was truly made.
His role in the deliberations was not the principal point of these conversa-
tions, but one could see in an instant how the personal qualities that drew us
to the man-the quickness and clarity of his mind, the warmth of his person-
ality, the energy that he brought to argument, his sensitivity to the views of oth-
ers-were present in the Conference Room and, even more, accounted for much
of what happened there. In conference, Justice Brennan always had more than
one vote. Who could possibly resist him when he grabbed you by the elbow,
or put his arm around your shoulder, and began, "Look, pal... "?
For many, including myself, the Justice's retirement will only compound
the sense of disaffection with the Court that now pervades the academy and
large sections of the profession. For a previous generation, the Supreme Court
was an institution of respect and admiration. Today the Court is seen as alien
and hostile, less devoted to reaffirming and actualizing our national ideals than
to protecting the established order, strengthening the hand of those who serve
it and belittling those who might challenge it. It is this perception that contribut-
ed to the rise of the Critical Legal Studies movement and its many cognates
during the late seventies and that gives this movement such widespread support
in the academy today. Yet the same disaffection is shared by those who have
more moderate or centrist commitments, those who still believe in the redemp-
tive possibility of law.
This disaffection is rooted in the overall pattern of decisions over the last
two decades. It is exacerbated, however, by the person of the Chief Justice who,
despite his amiability, appears so determined in his mission that he is willing
to disregard even the most elementary principles of the craft, and who managed,
in his two confirmation proceedings, to cast doubt on his own integrity. In the
first, he mischaracterized Justice Jackson's position in the deliberations leading
to Brown in an effort to explain away a memorandum he wrote as a law clerk
supporting Plessy v. Ferguson; in the second, he failed to explain adequately
why he did not recuse himself in a case involving military surveillance of civil-
ians during the Nixon administration in which, of course, he was an assistant
attorney general.
The Warren Court had its critics, as was known to anyone who, like myself,
studied at Harvard in the early sixties and witnessed Justice Brennan's an-
ger-soon abated-at the leading faction of the Harvard professorate and a
number of scholars associated with that school who denounced the Court in
terms most emphatic. This anger expressed itself in many ways, one quite
trivial: the Justice decided to end his practice of taking his clerks, as a matter
of course, from his own law school. My fellow clerk was his first from
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Yale-the stronghold of support for what the Court was then trying to accom-
plish-and on the last day of my clerkship I received a poem written by a
friend in the name of the Justice entitled "Ode to My Last Harvard Clerk." This
too would pass. But even in those days it was understood that Harvard did not
speak for the profession as a whole, and even less so for the young, who looked
to the Court as an inspiration, the very reason to enter the profession. Today,
the situation is completely different. The disaffection with the Court is not
localized, but pervades the profession, and swells within those who are just now
being initiated into it. For some, the Rehnquist Court speaks to their ideals, but
for most it is a source of cynicism and doubt.
Under these circumstances it is often difficult to see or present the body
of learning known as constitutional law as worthy of respect and admiration.
It is also difficult to know how the Court might continue to play its historic
function in the republic: how can it speak authoritatively and effectively to the
issues that divide us if the bar feels so alienated from it? To some, this loss of
authority might not seem so tragic, given the present course of decision. But
I wonder whether such a view is inappropriately short-sighted, seeing only what
is, without regard to what was and what might be. For all that it accomplished,
and still might, there is reason to believe in the Court. Yet I recognize that it
becomes more and more difficult to do so under the terms and conditions of
the governing coalition.
In musing on this predicament, my mind often turns to the Justice, and I
glance at the photograph that appears as the frontispiece of these Tributes.
While the Justice represents many things for me, probably none is more impor-
tant than his attachment to the Court as an institution. It is this attachment that
unifies the two phases of his career and accounts for the unusual role that he
created for himself during the last twenty years, as he saw so much that he
created and so much that he believes in dismantled and destroyed. Justice
Brennan served through these years in a cheerful and determined manner,
always with an unqualified devotion to the Court. I wonder whether those, like
myself, who wish to honor him and that extraordinary age of American law that
he helped bring into being, might not look to him as an exemplar and an
inspiration. He resisted, tenaciously, but kept the faith-why can't we?
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